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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the cyclical behavior of a number of industrial
labor markets of the pre—war (1923—1939) and post—war (1954—1982) eras. rn
the spirit of Burns and Mitchell we do not test a specific structural model
of the labor market but instead concentrate on describing the qualitative
features of the (monthly, industry—level) data.
The two principal questions we ask are: First, how is labor input (as
measured by the number of workers, the hours of work, and the intensity of
utilization) varied over the cycle? Second, what is the cyclical behavior
of labor compensation (as measured by real wages, product wages, and real
weekly earnings)? we study these questions in both the frequency domain and
the time domain.
Many of our findings simply reinforce, or perhaps refine, existing
perceptions of cyclical labor market behavior. However, we do find some
interesting differences between the pre—war and the post—war periods in the
relative use of layoffs and short hours in downturns, and in the cyclical
behavior of the real wage.
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I. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide a comparison of the cyclical
behavior of a number of industrial labor markets of the pre—war (1923—1939)
and post—war (1954—1982) eras. The methodology of this study follows that
of the traditional Burns and Mitchell (1946) business cycle analysis, in at
least two ways: First, the data employed are relatively disaggregated (we
use monthly data at the two- or three-digit industry level). Second, we
have not formulated or tested a specific structural model of labor markets
during the cycle but instead concentrate on measuring qualitative features
of the data. As did Burns and Mitchell, we see descriptive analysis of the
data as a useful prelude to theorizing about business cycles. Thus,
although the research reported in this paper permits no direct structural
inferences, it should be useful in restricting the class of structural
models or hypotheses which may subsequently be considered.
The principal questions of interest studied in this paper are also two
in number:
First, what are the means by which labor input is varied over the
business cycle? We consider the intensity of utilization (as measured by
gross labor productivity) ,hoursof work perweek,and the number of2
workersemployed. Boththetiming and relative magnitudes of the changes in
these quantities over the cycle are examined.
Second, what are the relationships over the cycle of output and labor
inputto measures of labor compensation? We look at the cyclical behavior
of product wages and real weekly earnings, as well as of real wages.
Asmight be expected, many of our findings are not novel; rather, they
tend to support and perhaps refine existing perceptions of cyclical labor
market behavior. However, we do reveal some interesting differences between
the pre—war and the post-war periods in the relative use of layoffs and
short hours in downturns, and in cyclical movements of the real wage.
Another finding is that labor productivity may behave in an anomalous manner
in more severe recessions. Finally, a number of the familiar regularities
are documented in a previously little—used data set, over an unusually long
sample period, and by means of some alternative methodologies.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews previous
empirical work on the cyclical behavior of labor market variables. Sections
III and IV introduce and describe the data set used in the present paper.
The behavior of key variables over the business cycle is analyzed by
frequency domain methods in Section V and by a time domain approach in
Section VI. Section VII focuses on labor market phenomena in four
particularly severe recessions. Results are summarized and conclusions
drawn in Section VIII.
II. previous Work: Some Regularities and Some Puzzles
There has been a great deal of empirical work that relates, sometimes
directly and sometimes tangentially, to the cyclical behavior of labor
markets. Without attempting to make an exhaustive survey, this section of3
the paper will try to summarize the major empirical findings of the
literature. We will also include some brief discussion of how various
authors have interpreted these findings. The reader is warned, however,
that because the focus of the present paper is description rather than
structural analysis, the results we will present later will do little to
resolve existing disputes about interpretation.
The discussion of this section will be organized around the two
questions of interest raised in the Introduction, i.e., the means by which
labor input is varied over the cycle and the cyclical relationship of labor
input and labor compensation. It might be said that by concentrating on
these two questions, rather than on such phenomena as the frequency and
duration of unemployment spells, cyclical variations in participation rates,
etc., we are emphasizing the "demand side" of the labor market at the
expense of the "supply side." This imbalance is unfortunate but is dictated
by the nature of the available pre—war data.
1 .Thecyclical pattern of labor utilization. The earliest empirical
work on the variation of labor input over the cycle was done in the context
of NBER business cycle research. Among the hundreds of data series whose
business cycle patterns were painstakingly analyzed by Wesley Mitchell, and
later by Mitchell and Arthur Burns, were a number of labor market variables.
For example, Mitchell (1951) documented the high conformity of employment
and weekly hours with output. (However, Mitchell was perhaps more
interested in labor cost measures; see below.)
An early NEER finding was the strong tendency of weekly hours (that is,
the length of the average work—week) to lead output and employment over the
cycle (Moore (1955), Bry (1959)). Weekly hours subsequently became a4
component of the Bureau's well—known index of leading indicators. (For a
relatively recent discussion and updating of this index, see Zarnowitz and
Boschan (1975).) Other labor market variables identified as leading the
cycle by the NBER included accession and layoff rates and initial claims for
unemployment insurance (Shiskin (1961)). Employment and unemployment were
found to be coincident with the cycle.
Arguably the most important contribution of the NEER research program
in this area was the classic paper by Hultgren (1960). With the purpose of
investigating an hypothesis of Mitchell about labor cost, Hultgren collected
monthly data on output, aggregate hours worked, and payrolls for 23
industries. (The sample period was 1932-58.) With these and other data,
Hultgren discovered that output per worker—hour is procyclical (or,
equivalently, that employment and hours worked vary relatively less over the
cycle than does output.)
The finding of procyclical labor productivity, or "short—run increasing
returns to labor" (SRIRL), spawned a voluminous literature. Important early
contributions were made by Kuh (1960, 1965), Okun (1962), Eckstein and
Wilson (1964), and Brechling (1965). (Okun's famous "law" is, of course,
SRIRL applied to the aggregate economy.) These and numerous other studies
(including, notably, Ball and St. Cyr (1966), Masters (1967), Brechling and
O'Brien (1967), and Ireland and Smyth (1967)) found the SRIRL phenomenon to
be ubiquitous: It occurs at both high and low levels of output aggregation,
for both production and non-production workers, and in virtually all
industrial countries.
Because of the neoclassical presumption of diminishing marginal returns
to factors of production, SRIRL was perceived originally (and, to some
extent, still is) as a deep puzzle. One favored explanation was that,5
because of the existence of specific human capital, firms 'hoard" labor
during downturns (Oi (1962), Solow (1968), Fair (1969)); the hoarded labor
is utilized more fully as demand recovers, giving the illusion of increasing
returns. For empirical purposes, the labor hoarding model has become
closely identified with a model in which increasing marginal costs of
adjusting the labor stock induce the firm to move toward the desired level
of employment only gradually (Brechling (1965), Coen and Hickman (1970));
conceptually, however, the two models are not quite the same. Another
popular explanation of SRIRL is that it is a reflection of unobserved (by
the econometrician) variations in capital utilization rates that are
associated with changes in labor input (Ireland and Smyth (1967), Lucas
(1970), Solow (1973), Nadiri and Rosen (1973), and Tatom (1980)).
What is probably the most general current view is that SRIPL is the
outcome of a complex dynamic optimization problem solved by the firm, in
which labor is only one of a number of inputs, each with a possibly
different degree of quasi—fixity. For example, Nadiri and Rosen (1973)
emphasized that the rate at which employment will be varied depends not only
on the costs of adjusting labor stocks but also the costs of adjusting all
other inputs (including inventories and rates of utilization); F'torrison and
Berndt (1981) showed that these interactions could result in the SRIRL
phenomenon even if labor itself were a perfectly variable factor.
Overall, the research which followed Hultgren's original paper has made
two valuable contributions to knowledge: First, from Brechling (1965) to
Nadiri and Rosen (1973) to Sims (1974), there has been generated a wealth of
empirical material on the sluggish short-run response of employment to
output change, and on the relationship over the cycle of employment to hours
worked, inventories, and other factors of production. Second, the general6
dynamicoptimization model of firm input utilization developed in this
literature has proved to be a most useful and flexible research tool. (For
example, it has permitted the incorporation of rational expectations; see
Sargent (1978) or Pindyck and Rotemberg (1982).)
We may summarize the received findings on the cyclical behavior of
labor inputs, as follows: Employment and weekly hours are procyclical.
Productivity is also procyclical, i.e., employment and worker—hours vary
less than output over the cycle. Finally, weekly hours lead output, while
employment coincides with or possibly lags output over the cycle.
2. Labor compensation over the cycle. While the qualitative behavior
of labor inputs over the business cycle seems relatively well established,
thereis very little agreement about how to characterize the cyclical
movements of labor compensation, especially ofrealwages. The debate about
realwages began when Keynes (1936) conjectured that, again because of
diminishing marginal returns, labor's marginal productivity and hence the
real wage should be countercyclical.2 Empirical studies by Dunlop (1938)
and Tarshis (1939) purported to show that this conjecture was false; but
these studies were in turn disputed (see Bodkin (1969) for references.) The
debate prompted Keynes (1939) to aver that countercyclical real wages were
in fact not an essential implication of his theory.
Postwar research has done little to resolve the question of the
cyclical behavior of real wages. One can find papers supporting
procyclicality (Bodkin (1969), Stocknan (1983)), countercyclicality (Neftci
(1978), Sarqent (1978), Otani (1978), Chirinko (1981)), and acyclicality
(Geary and Kennan (1982)). Altonji and Ashenfelter (1980) have argued that
the best statistical model of the real wage is the random walk. It would7
not be of much help for us to present a detailed comparison of these papers
here. Instead, we simply list some of the major methodological issues that
have arisen in this literature:
First, researchers have typically found that their results are
sensitive to whether the nominal wage is deflated by an index of output
prices, such as the Wpi or ppi, or by a cost-of-living index, such as the
CPI. (See Ruggles (1940), Bodkin (1969), or Geary and Kennan (1982).) This
does not seem unreasonable, since the wage divided by the output price
(henceforth, the "product wage") corresponds conceptually to the "demand
price" of labor, while the wage deflated by the cost of living (henceforth,
the "real wage") corresponds to the "supply price"; it is not difficult to
think of conditions under which the short-run behaviors of these two
variables might differ. Unfortunately, however, the difference in behavior
does not seem to vary systematically across studies.
Second, there is some dispute over whether the contemporaneous
correlation of the real wage and output (or employment) is an interesting
measure of the real wage's cyclical pattern. Neftci (1978) and Sagent
(1978) have argued that, because of the complex dynamics of the wage—
employment relationship, it is necessary to look at correlations atmany
leads and lags.(See also Clark and Freeman (1980).)
Finally, it has been found that empirical results concerning the short—
run behavior of wages may be particularly sensitive to aggregation biases,
both when the aggregation is over individuals (Stockmnan (1983)) and when it
is over industries (Chirinko (1981)).
The apparently very weak relationship of real wages and the business
cycle has posed a problem for some prominent theories of cyclical
fluctuations (or at least for simple versions of those theories;see, for8
example,Altonji and Ashenfelter (1980) and Ashenfelter and Card (1982)).
However, attempts to reconcile the low correlation of wages and the cycle
with theories of short-run employment fluctuations have also led to a number
of interesting lines of research: These include disequilibrium modelling of
the cycle (Solow and stiglitz (1968), Barro and Grossman (1971));
contractingapproaches that divorce wage payments and short-run labor
allocations (see Hall (1980)for a discussion); Lucas's (1970)theory of
capacity and overtime; andothers.
Realand product wages are not theonly measures of laborcompensation
whosecyclical behavior have been studied, although they have absorbed a
large part of the research effort. Mitchell theorized in very early work
that unit labor costs might play an important role in the business cycle;
Hultgren's (1960, 1965) studies found that, in reasonably close
correspondence to Mitchell's prediction, labor costs lag the cycle. Various
other compensation measures were studied by the NBER analysts: nominal
laborincome,for example, was reported by Shiskin (1961) to be coincident
withthe cycle.
Anothervariable that has commanded some attention is the nominal wage.
In an NBER occasional paper, Creamer (1950) studied monthly wage rates in a
number of industries for the 1919-31 period. (His aggregate wage rate
series extended to 1935.) Creamer's most important conclusion was that
nominal wage rates lagged business activity by nine months or more, a
findingthatwas viewed by some subsequent authors as supporting the
"stickiness" of wages. (Creamer also showed that the cyclical behaviors of
anindex ofwage rates and of average hourly earnings were similar, a very
usefulresultgiven the paucity of direct information onwagerates.)
"Stickiness" was also a major issue forlater students of the nominal wage:9
For example, Sachs (1980) has argued that wages became relativelymore rigid
after World War II, while Gordon (1982) has found u.s. postwarwages to be
stickier than those of the U.K. and Japan. Gordon's result is theopposite
of earlier characterizations by Sachs (1979) and others.
Overall, the question of how to characterize the cyclical behavior of
labor compensation remains rather unsettled. This isunfortunate, given the
central role of wages in much of macroeconomic theory.
III. The Data
The present paper reassesses the qualitative empirical findings
described in the last section, with particular attentionpaid to possible
differences between the pre—war and post-war eras. This sectionintroduces
our data set and compares it briefly with what has been employedby others.
The data we use are monthly, roughly at the level of the"industry",
and cover the time periods 1923—1939 and 1954—1982. We felt thatthe high—
frequency data were necessary if short—run relationships were to be
distinguished; the industry—level data were used both to reduceaggregation
bias and to avoid reliance on the aggregate productionindices, which are
poorly constructed for our purpose (see below). In contrast to our
approach, few studies since Hultgren have used monthly, industry—level data
(Fair (1969) is an important exception). Also, littlerecent-work has used
pre—war data; the exceptions have typically looked at only annual, highly
aqgrega ted numbers.
There were many variables that we could have chosen tostudy.
Considerations of data availability and economic relevance led to the
following short list (with mnemonic abbreviations):10
1•IP Industry output or production
2.EMP Employment (number of production workers)
3.HRS Hours of work perweek(perproduction worker)
4.PROD Gross labor productivity =IP/(EMPxHRS)
5. WR Average hourly earnings (nominal) divided by a cost-
of—living index; the "real wage."
6. WP Average hourly earnings divided by the industry
wholesale output price; the "product wage"
7.EARN Real weekly earnings perproductionworker =HRSxWR.
In the analysis below, we concentrate not on the levels of the above
variables but on the log—differences (roughly, the monthly growth rates).
From now on, therefore, the mnemonic names just defined should be understood
to denote log—differences.
The above variables were collected for eight pre-war manufacturing,
eight post—war manufacturing, and three post—war non—manufacturing
industries. These industries are listed in Table 1 •Notethat the eight
--Table 1 about here-—
pre—war and post—war manufacturing industries are approximately a "matched
set." This was done to facilitate comparison of the two eras. We did not
have comparable pre—war data for the three non—manufacturing industries.
However, we included these industries because they represent major sectors
of the economy (mining, utilities, and construction), and because it seemed
to us that non—manufacturing industries have been slighted somewhat
(relative to manufacturinq industries) by students of the business cycle.
Some explanation should be given for the rather miscellaneous character
of the manufacturing industries chosen. For the pre—war period, the eight11
industries included represent the largest class for which complete and
reasonably consistent data were available. In particular, our desire to
have series on hours of work restricted us to industries regularly surveyed,
beginning in the early 1920's, by the National Industrial Conference Board.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics, which surveyed many more industries, did not
collect hours data before 1932. Also, we included only industries whose
output indices were based on direct measures of physical output (e.g.,
number of automobiles) rather than on scaled—up input measures (e.g.,
manhours). A wider selection of industries is available for the post—war,
of course, but because of the burden of collecting and entering the data,
only those manufacturing industries "matching" the available pre—war
industries were used. In terms of employment or value added, the industries
here studied made up about one—fifth of total manufacturing in the pre—war
era and about one—sixth of total manufacturing after the war.
A nice fringe benefit of using the Conference Board data rather than
that from the BLS is that it gives us a pre—war data set that has not been
previously analyzed, except in a partial and desultory way by some earlier
NBER studies. In particular, it is quite different from the data set used
by Hultgren (1960).
A potential problem with studying only manufacturing industries which
have more—or—less continuous identities since the 1920's is that it biases
the sample toward older, often declining industries, at the expense of new
and growing fields. However, for the purpose of studying cyclical (as
opposed to trend) behavior of labor market variables, this sample bias is
probably not important. In particular, our informal comparisons of the12
declining manufacturing industries with the expanding manufacturing and non—
manufacturing industries did not reveal obvious differences in cyclical
behavior.
For the purposes of comparison with the industry-level findings, we
also analyzed pre—war and post—war monthly data for aggregate manufacturing.
Although these data obviously have broader coverage than the industry data,
we have less confidence in the results using aggregates, for three reasons:
(1) Aggregation across industries introduces well—known cyclical biases.
(2) The aggregate production indices are heavily contaminated with input-
based measures of output. (3) The pre—war output, price, and labor input
series are not perfectly mutually consistent. (See the data appendix for an
explanation, and for a more detailed discussion of all the data and their
sources.)
IV.SomeBasic Statistics
Most of the analysis discussed below follows the application of a
deseasonalization process and the removal of means from the log—differenced
series. As a preliminary step, this section looks at some features of the
raw log—differences.
Tables 2 and 3 present the means of the variables for each industry and
for the pre—war and post—war periods separately. The means are multiplied
by 100 and thus can be interpreted approximately as percentage rates of
growth per month.
--Table2about here—-
Consideringfirst the productivity column in Table 2, we note that
average pre—war rates of productivity growth compared well to those of the13
post—war. Rates of productivity growth were higher during1923-1939 than
during 1954—1982 in five of the eight manufacturing industries, aswell as
in aggregate manufacturing. The pre—war rate of productivity growthreached
rather exceptional levels in automobiles, paper and pulp, and iron and
steel. The rapid expansion of pre—war productivity observed in thesedata
supports the view that the period between the world wars (particularlythe
1920's) was a time of transformation of industrial technologies, leading to
sharp reductions in costs; see Jerome (1934) and Bernstein (1960). Inthe
post-war, the best productivity performance among our manufacturing
industries was by paper and allied products; best overall in the post—war
sample was by electric services.
productivity growth is, of course, definitionally equal to output
growth minus the sum of employment and hours growth. Examiningthese
constituents of productivity, we note first that the fastest pre-war growth
in output was experienced by automobiles and by paper and pulp; in the post-
war period, paper took the output growth honors for manufacturing,with
electric services again doing best overall. It appears that the high output
industries were also the high productivity industries; the rank correlation
between output growth and productivity growth is .945 for the eight pre-war
industries, .913 for the eleven post—war industries.
Despite the Depression of the 1930's, employment growth in the pre-war
manufacturing industries studied tended to exceed that in their post—war
counterparts (seven of eight cases); this was also true for the aggregates.
This difference largely reflects serious long—term declines by a number of
the post—war industries: In wool textiles, leather tanning and finishing,
and footwear, pre—war tendencies toward decline accelerated after the war;
in iron and steel, pre—war growth in employment changed to post—war14
shrinkage. The strongest employment growth in the sample took place in two
post—war non—manufacturing industries (electric services and construction).
As a whole, the employment column of Table 2 is consistent with the of ten—
noted secular fall in the fraction of total employment absorbed by
manufacturing.
The behavior of the last component of productivity, hours of work, was
quite different in the two sample periods, Weekly hours declined steadily
during the pre—war in all industries, most precipitously in iron and steel
(a notorious "long—hours" industry during the early 1920's, in which 84—hour
work—weeks were not uncommon). This fall reflected changes in work
organization during the 1920's (in a few cases as a response to the pressure
of public opinion against long hours), and the "work—sharing" of the
depressed 1930's (sometimes initiated by employers, sometimes the result of
New Deal legislation or union demands); see Zeisel (1958) for further
discussion. In contrast, the post—war work week was almost perfectly
stable.
Finally, we may consider the mean rates of growth of the alternative
measures of production worker compensation (Table 3). It is interesting
-—Table 3 about here--
that, although productivity gains during the pre-war period were larger than
during the post-war in only five of the eight manufacturing industries
studied, real wage growth was significantly larger during the pre—war in all
eight industries, as well as in the aggregate. pre—war product wages also
rose sharply, except in boots and shoes. Within the major sample periods,
the rank correlation of real wage growth with productivity growth was .815
for the eight pre—war industries, .864 for the eleven post—war industries.15
(Although these correlations are high, note that they are somewhat lower
than the correlations of productivity and output growth reported above.)
The large pre—war growth in real wages was not fully reflected in increases
in worker buying power, as the last column of Table 3 shows; because of the
sharp declines in hours of work, real weekly earnings rose much more slowly
than real wages.
Turning from the first to the second moments: Tables 4 and 5 contain
—-Table 4 about here——
——Table 5 about here——
the standard deviations of the raw log—differences, multiplied by 100 so as
to be interpretable as percentages. we will not comment on these figures
except to note, first, how surprisingly large the variability of the
industry data often is, and, second, that aggregation seems to reduce
measuredvariability somewhat. To see how much of total variability was
attributable to business cycles, we useda frequency domain technique to
wipe out the variance associated with the high-frequency (i.e., seasonal)
and the low—frequency (i.e. trending or long—wave) bands. The resulting
standard deviations for five key variables are in Table 6. Three facts are
—-Table 6 about here-—
obvious from the table: First, the share of total variability of the data
to be associated with business cycles is relatively small, both in the pre-
war and post—war periods. Second, the business cycle has dampened
considerably during the post-war. Third, in most industries the cyclical
variance of hours of work per week has, between the pre—war and post—war
periods, been reduced relatively more than that of employment.16
This last observation, which is also confirmed in the raw data (Table
4) and in Section VII below, is worth remarking on a bit further. Why have
post-war employers relied relatively more heavily on layoffs, rather than on
short work-weeks, to reduce labor input in downturns? Two possible sources
ofthe change are the greater post-war importance of unions and the advent
of unemployment insurance programs. Union objective functions might be such
thatlayoffs of a relatively small number of junior workers are preferred to
a general reduction of hours. (Cross—sectional evidence that unions prefer
layoffs was presented in Medoff (1979). Medoff also cited a study by
Slichter et al. (1960) which claimed that unions, which initially approved
of some work—sharing, moved towards a preference for layoffs in the early
post—war period.) perhaps more important than unionism is the fact that in
the United States, fully unemployed workers can receive government
compensation but the partially unemployed can not. See Baily (1977) for a
formal analysis.
V. Analysis in the Frequency Domain
We turn now to the study of these variables over the business cycle.
In order to obtain characterizations of "typical" cyclical patterns, we
subjected the data to both frequency domain and time domain analysis. In
the frequency domain work we followed the approach suggested by Granger and
Hatanaka (1964); in the time domain our analysis is in the spirit of Sims
(1980). (There are, of course, close formal connections between these two
approaches; this is evidenced by the similarity of the results obtained.)
The results from the frequency domain will be discussed here. Those from
the time domain are presented in Section VI.17
The data used in the frequency domain work (as well as in the time
domain) were the deseasonalized log—differences of the basic series.
(Deseasonalization was done by the use of seasonal dummies; see the data
appendix.) Each variable was analyzed separately by industry and for the
pre—war and post—war sample periods.
Spectra of these data showed power in the business—cycle—frequency
range, but rarely were clear peaks apparent in that range. (Sargent (1979,
p. 254) warns that this is to be expected.) We decided to investigate the
properties of cycles with periods exceeding one year (so as to exclude
remaining seasonal and other high—frequency influences) but less than eight
years. (According to the NBER chronology, the longest business cycle in our
sample -theone extending from 1929 to 1937 —waseight years in length.)
For each industry/sample period, we calculated the coherences and phase
relationships of the variables over the one— to eight—year band.
The coherences of six variables (the rates of growth of employment,
weekly hours, productivity, real wages, product wages, and real weekly
earnings) with the rate of growth of industry output over the business cycle
range are reported in Table 7. (Standard errors of the coherence estimates
——Table 7 about here——
are also included. See the appendix for a description of how these were
calculated.) Coherence is a measure of the degree of association of a pair
of variables over a prescribed set of frequencies; a coherence of zero
indicates the minimum association, a coherence of one the maximum. The
table suggests that employment and hours bear the strongest relationship to
output over the business cycle. productivity and earnings also are strongly18
related to output, for most industries. The connection between the two wage
measures and output is erratic across industries and, on the whole, is
weaker; this is especially true in the post-war period. Note, however, that
the coherences of wages and output appear to be statistically significant in
both periods.
A particularly informative exercise in the frequency domain is the
calculation of phase relationships. For a given frequency, think of
variables as tracing out sine curves over time. Then the "phase lead" of
variable A with respect to variable B is the number of months after A
reaches a given point on its sinusoidal path that B reaches the
corresponding point, we shall say that a variable that has a phase lead
with respect to output of near zero is "procyclical"; a variable whose phase
lead with respect to output is approximately half the period of the full
cycle is "countercyclical." (There are, however, some caveats to this
interpretation of phase leads; see Hause (1971).)
The phase leads of six variables with respect to output growth, plus
standard errors, are given in Table 8. The phase leads are evaluated
---Table8about here-—
atthe frequency with period of fifty—four months, the period at the center
of the range considered. (See the appendix for more discussion.) We find
thatemployment, hours, and earnings are roughly procyclical. Productivity
is procyclical but slightly leading in the post—war; its lead over output is
greater in the pre-war period. Hours typically leads, though by less than
productivity, while employment consistently lags a few months behind output.
Earnings is approximately coincident.19
The interrelationship of productivity, hours, output, and employment,
is essentially stable between the pre—war and post-war and, except for the
introduction of some subtleties in timing, is consistent with earlier
findings. In conjunction with the dynamic model of the firm discussed in
Section II, this interrelationship suggests a simple economic
interpretation: Cycles are dominated by demand changes. Firms anticipating
an increase in demand respond first by increasing nonlabor inputs and asking
for more work effort; this increases productivity. As demand strengthens,
hours of work expand.Finally, as the increase in demand assumes greater
permanence, firms make the hiring and training investments needed to add to
the workforce. This story is hardly original (see, for example, Baily
(1977)), and we emphasize again that we have done no explicitly structural
test. Still, it is interesting that this interpretation seems at least to
be consistent with the facts for so many disparate industries, and for both
the pre—war and post—war eras.
This stability across industries and sample periods is not shared by
the relationship of wages and output. There seems to be a definite
difference between the pre—war and post—war behavior of wages. Let us
concentrate on real, rather than product, wages: During the pre—war period,
real wages lagged output significantly —notquite enough to be called
countercyclical, but still "half out-of—phase."3 (A well—known example of
this is the positive growth of real wages in 1931-32, even as output and
employment plunged.) In contrast, during the post—war period real wages
were nearly in phase (procyclical), even leading the cycle in some
industries.20
Why did the cyclical behavior of real wages change between the pre-war
and post—war periods? A satisfactory answer to this question would require
an explicit structural model, which we do not attempt in this paper.
However, we do present a simple heuristic example which suggests that this
change may be related to one of our earlier findings, that layoffs have
become relatively more important than work-sharing in the post-war period.
Suppose that, because of fixed costs, workers can hold only one job at
a time. (This example will generalize as long as an individual's work
effort is not infinitely divisible among employers.) Then the labor market
is cleared not by the hourly wage, but by the total utility available to the
worker in a job. Assume that workers get utility from total real
compensation Y and disutility from hours of work per week H. If,
for simplicity, the marginal utilities of income and leisure are taken to be
constant, then instantaneous utility at time t, U, can be written as
U =Y —c.H
t t t
where OI.is a parameter.
To retain their labor forces, firms must provide workers with (y, H)
combinations such that workers' utility equals or exceeds U, the
(exogenous) utility level obtainable elsewhere in the economy. Assuming for
purposes of this example that business cycles are regular sine waves, and
thatis procyclical, we can write
(2) = +a sin t)21
whereis average obtainable utility, and a is a positive parameter
measuring the cyclical sensitivity of U.
Firms'choices about which Ht) combinations to offer (from among
those combinatins that satisfy the external utility constraint) will arise
from a maximization calculation that takes into account the nature of the
production function, the existence ofspecific human capital or adjustment
costs,etc. For this heuristic example we do not explicitly specify the
firm's maximization problem but simply assume (realistically) that its
outcome will imply a procyclical workweek:
(3) Ht =H0
(1 + b sin t)
where H0 is the average workweek over the cycle and b measures the
workweek's cyclical sensitivity. (3) is to be interpreted as a reduced
form; the parameter b may well depend on the other parameters in the
problem.
The three equations just given, plus the assumption that real earnings
are just high enough to meet the external utility constraint, imply that the
cyclical behavior of real earnings perworkeris:
=( +cH0) + (a + cb) sin t
Average earnings Y0 equal +
In this example, the measured "real wage" W is just Yt/Ht. Under what
circumstances will the measured wage be procyclical (i.e., have a positive22
sensitivity to the exogenous cycle)? It is easy to show that the necessary
and sufficient condition for real wage procyclicality is
(5) a>b
That is, wages are procyclical if reservation utility has a greater
sensitivity to the cycle than do hours of work.
It is difficult to say what has happened over time to the cyclical
sensitivity of reservation utility; perhaps reservation utility has become
less cyclical in the past-war, which would work against the present
argument. However, in Section IV we introduced evidence that b, the
cyclical sensitivity of hours, has fallen in the post—war. The example
shows that, everything else being equal, reduced cyclical sensitivity of
hours tends to be associated with greater observed procyclicality in real
wages. Thus, two of the novel findings of this paper —thathours have
become less procyclical and real wages more procyclical in the past—war —may
be related.
P.n important question is whether the cyclical relationships described
in Tables 7 and 8 are the same in long and short business cycles. Closely
related is the issue of whether it is useful to study "reference cycles."
Burns and Mitchell frequently measured timing relationships in terms of
"stages" of a standard "reference cycle" instead of in calendar time. For
this to be worthwhile, it must be the case that cyclical lead/lag
relationships are roughly constant fractions of the cycle length, rather
than constant when measured in calendar time; that is to say, phase angles
must be constant across business cycle frequencies.23
Some insight on this question is provided by Table 9. That table gives
——Table 9 about here-—
the estimates of the phase leads of the six variables for the
deseasonalized—high—frequency band (2—12 months); for short cycles (1—2
years); and for long cycles (2-8 years). (The business cycle band was
broken up in that particular way because there are approximately as many
frequencies with periods between 12 and 24 months as there are with periods
between 24 and 96 months.) Also reported for each variable are the results
of a statistical test for constancy of phase angles between short and long
business cycles. Inspection of Table 9 suggests two observations:
First, while not much systematic emerges in the high—frequency band,
the qualitative pattern of leads and lags is the same in the short and long
business cycles ranges (the (b) and (c) rows in the table). For example,
productivity still leads the cycle, employment still lags.
Second, there appears to be a bit of support for the "reference cycle"
construction (and, by implication, for the "time deformation" approach to
cycles recently suggested by Stock (1983)). The hypothesis of constant
phase angles between short and long business cycles, which is implied by the
reference cycle approach, is not usually rejected by the data. (Exceptions
are the pre—war meat—packing industry, and, to some extent, aggregate
manufacturing in both the pre—war and post-war.) Thus, assuming that leads
and lags are proportional to cycle length does not seem unreasonable. On the
other hand, it should be noted that this evidence in favor of reference
cycles may possibly be spurious: As an example in Hause (1971) shows, two
variables with a fixed distributed lag relationship in the time domain may24
also exhibit a phase relationship which is roughly proportional to the
period of the cycle.
The observations we have made so far apply to more or less all of the
industries in the sample, with a few distinctions having been drawn between
the patterns visible in the pre—war period and those in the post—war. We
had hoped to be able to make more cross—sectional distinctions (e.g., like
the finding of Nadiri and Rosen (1973) that input responses are much more
rapid in durable goods industries.) unfortunately, much less cross—
sectional variation than we expected was evident when we grouped the
industries in the obvious ways.
To see if the industries might be grouped by the nature of their
cyclical behavior, we estimated the coherences and phases between industry
outputs and the aggregate index of output, for the pre-war and post—war
periods separately. These are presented in Table 10. An odd result is that
——Table 10 about here——
almost all of the phase leads are positive; this may be due to the inclusion
of input—based measures of output in the aggregate index. The coherence
estimates suggest that cyclical influences became relatively less important
for the industries in the post-war period. There is also a tendency in the
post—war sample for durable goods industries to exhibit a relatively higher
coherence with the cycle than non—durable industries. However, except for
meat—packing, there is surprisingly little evidence of this pattern in the
pre—war. overall, cross—sectional differences still seem less significant
than cross—sectional simi lan ties.25
VI. Analysis in the Time Domain
To complement the frequency domain analysis of the data, we employed
time—domain methods, primarily vector autoregression (VAR5).Separate VAR5,
using twelve monthly lags of four variables (output, hours, employment, and
real wages), were estimated for each of the pre—war andpost—war industries,
and for the aggregates. The data were the same centered and seasonalized
log—differences described in Section V. As in Sims(1980),theestimated
VARs were used to do three things: First, we looked at the statistical
significance of blocks of coefficients in order to search for patterns of
causality (in the Granger sense). Second, we calculated the percentages of
the forecast errors attributable to (triangularized) innovations in the
right—hand—side variables, for four forecast horizons. Finally, the implied
impulse—response diagrams were examined for systematic timing relationships
among the variables. We briefly discuss each of these exercises.
Table 11 summarizes the results of the Granger—causality F—tests.
-—Table 11 about here
There is one matrix for each dependent variable. Ineachmatrix, the rows
designatethe industry to which the VAR applies, the columns give the block
of independent variables being tested. One, two, or three asterisks ina
givencell of a matrix implies that the twelve monthly lags of the
independent variable jointly "explain" the dependent variable (for the given
industry and period) at the .10, .05, or .01 level of significance. No
asterisks in a cell implies that the joint contribution of all lags of the
given regressor is not significant at the ten per cent level.
Table11 suggests that, for all industries taken together:26
(1) Output growth tends to be relatively exogenous (in the Granger
sense), at least in comparison with the growth rates of employment and
hours. (Thus hours may be a "leading indicator" without having incremental
predictive value for output. See Neftci (1979).) Output seemed to be much
more "persistent" in the post—war period, in the sense that lagged growth
rates of output became much stronger predictors of the current growth rate.
(2) Hours and employment are rarely found to be Granger—exogenoUs;
they respond both to each other and to output. The two variables are also
found to be persistent ,inthe sense just defined, in both the pre—war and
post—war samples. The persistence of employment will be an appealing
finding to supporters of the view that there are "adjustment costs" to
changing employment. Are there also adjustment costs to changing hours of
work? The data seem consistent with this.
(3) The real wage seems to vary nearly independently of the three
other variables, neither consistently predicting nor being predictable by
them. A remarkably strong finding about the real wage is that, like output,
its persistence significantly increased between the pre—war and post—war
periods.
The results of the forecast error decomposition exercise are given in
——Table 12 about here——
Table 12. To save space, we report results for three industries only: iron
and steel (a durables goods industry), paper and pulp (non—durables), and
leather tanning and finishing (semi—durables). Results for the
manufacturing aggregates are also reported. The pre—war and post—war
forecast error decompositions are placed side—by—side in the table, for27
easier comparison. Also, note that, since the growth in productivity is
just a linear combination of the growth in output, hours, and employment
(all of which were included in the VARs), it is possible to report
decomposition for this variable as well.
As the reader familiar with these methods is aware, the attribution of
forecast error at different horizons to the (triangularized) innovations in
the regressors is not invariant to the ordering of the variables. The
ordering used here (and for the construction of the impulse—response
diagrams, below) is as follows: (log—differences of) output, hours,
employment, real wages. Given that the data are monthly, and that forecast
horizons up to 48 months are studied, the choice of ordering is not likely
to be crucial to the results.
The pattern of relationships suggested by Table 12 is, perhaps not
surprisingly, very similar to that revealed by the F—tests reported in Table
11.Note,for example, that the relatively exogenous output variable (IP)
is shown in Table 12 to be largely "self—caused," even at the four—year
forecast horizon. (This tendency seems to be even greater in the post—war
period than in the pre—war.) Hours and employment are fairly sensitive to
output innovations except, for some reason, in the post—war leather
industry. The "persistence" of both hours and employment is apparent; this
persistence increases markedly for hours in the post—war. The productivity
variable is largely driven by innovations in output, especially in the post-
war, although productivity's other components (employment and hours) also
play a role.
Again, a most striking finding is the relationship (or lack of a
relationship) between real wages and the other variables: Innovations in
the real wage appear to have virtually no predictive power for output,28
employment, and weekly hours; and, in the other direction, no variable
except the real wage itself is of much use in forecasting the real wage.
This essential independence of the real wage and the other variables is more
pronounced in the post—war period.
The final exercise in the time domain was the use of the estimated VAR5
to generate impulse—response (IR) diagrams. These diagrams show the
movement over time of each variable in the VAR in response to a
(triangularized) innovation to one of the regressors. (The response of
productivity to innovations in the other variables was also analyzed.) The
ordering of the variables was the same as in the forecast error
decompositions, above. Since the data are in log—differences, we printed
out cumulative—response diagrams; this allowed us to interpret the patterns
in terms of log—levels. These diagrams were useful for gaining a
qualitative appreciation of "typical" short—run patterns in the data.
The number of industries, variables, and sample periods meaflt that
there were potentially hundreds of IR diagrams to study. we chose to look
carefully only at the three representative industries (iron and steel,
paper, leather); we also looked closely at construction. The reader will be
burdened with only a few sample IR diagrams (see Figures 1—2). These show
——Figures 1 —2about here——
the 48—month response pattern of (the log—levels of) output, hours,
employment, real wages, and productivity to a one—standard—deviation
innovation in output growth in the iron and steel industry. Figures 1(a)
through 1(d) are for the pre—war period; Figures 2(a) through 2(d) are for29
the post—war. The path of output is included in each diagram, for
reference.
From our examination of all the IR diagrams, we drew the following
conclusions:
(1) Generally, the IRS reinforce the characterization of the cycle
obtained in the frequency domain. For example, the conclusion of Section V
that productivity is highly coherent with output and that it tends to lead
the cycle by a few months emerges distinctly from the IR diagrams; this is
true no matter which disturbance term provides the initial shock.
Similarly, the high coherence and the lead/lag patterns for hours and
employment found by frequency domain techniques recur almost exactly in the
IRs. Figures 1(a), 1(b), 1(d), 2(a), 2(b), and 2(d) are here perfectly
representative.
(2) As the frequency domain analysis was less clear about the cyclical
characteristics of the real wage, so it is the case in the time domain. The
pictures show a real wage behavior which is not very stable across
industries and which is also sensitive to the source of the initial shock,
especially in the pre—war sample. However, as in Section IV, there still
appear to be noticeable differences between pre—war and post—war wage
movements. (See Figures 1(c) and 2(c)). During the post—war, in the cases
when there is a visible relationship between output and wages, the IRs show
the real wage to be a roughly coincident, procyclical variable. In the pre-
war data, the real wage is usually "half out—of—phase," either lagging (the
typical response to output shocks; see Figure 1(c)) or leading (when there
is an employment shock). There is also an interesting contrast between the
pre—war and post—war periods with regard to the effect of a wage shock on
the rest of the system: A pre—war wage shock tends to result in declining30
output and employment, while a wage shock in the post—war sampletypically
hasjust the opposite effect.
(3) Finally, the diagrams show a post—war decline in cyclical
variability (given a "typical" shock), which is consistent with several
findings already discussed. Output and real wages in particular (reflecting
their increased "persistence"?) are much less prone to gyrations in the
post—war sample.
VII. Four Major Recessions
The analysis so far has been "democratic" in its use of the data,
allowing every sample observation an equal weight in the calculations. This
is consistent with the view that business cycles are realizations of
stationary stochastic processes. An alternative view is that serious
recessions or depressions are "special" occurrences, governed by different
laws of probability than the "normal" parts of the sample. (This idea is
investigated more formally by the Blanchard—Watson paper in this volume.)
In the spirit of this alternative view, this section looks briefly at the
behavior of labor market variables during four major downturns —twopre—war
and two post—war.
The four downturns studied are 1929 111—1933 I; 1937 11—1938 II; 1973
IV —1975I; and 1981 111—1982 IV, where Roman numerals denote quarters.
Note that, except for the first, the recessions are of comparable length.
(The peak and trough quarters are from the official NBER chronology.)
-—Table13about here——31
For each of the four downturns, Table 13 gives (for each of the seven labor
market variables studied) the ratio of the average value of the level of the
variable in the trough quarter to its average value in the preceding peak
quarter. (The data are detrended and deseasonalized.) The purpose of this
is to get a rough measure of the behavior of these variables in individual
major recessions. (Alternatives would have been to construct multi—stage
Burns—Mitchell "reference cycles" or to look at all quarters of the
downturns, we experimented with both of these but did not find them much
more informative.)
A preliminary point that should be made is that the designated peaks
and troughs are based on aggregate economic variation, which may not
coincide exactly with the industry—level cycles. Nevertheless, there is
obviously a strong correlation between aggregate and industry output: In
Table 13 the trough—to—peak ratio for (detrended) production exceeds one
only four times in thirty—eight cases.
The trough—to—peak ratios for most of the variables displayed in Table
13 do not seem too far out of line with our findings of previous sections.
Enp1oyment and hours display their strong procyclicality throughout. As in
Section Iv, we see again here that post—war employers seemed to rely more on
layoffs than on short weeks as the means of reducing labor input in the
trough, while pre—war employers relied relatively more heavily on part—time
work. Real wages show little systematic peak—to—trough change, which is
indicative of the low coherence of real wages and output. product wages are
more variable than real wages; they also show some tendency to
countercyclicality. Weekly real earnings, as would be predicted ,are
clearly procyclical.32
A variable which is somewhat puzzling is productivity. The standard
finding that productivity is procyclical implies that its trough—to—peak
ratio should be less than one. This ratio is actually below one only about
half of the thirty—four cases in which output declines between peak and
trough, productivity is most procyclical in the heavy durable—goods
industries (iron and steel, automobiles); in the other industries
productivity is more likely to rise than fall, peak-to—trough.
A partial explanation of these results may follow from our earlier
finding that productivity, although essentially procyclical, may lead the
cycle by a number of months. Thus productivity at the output peak has
already fallen from its highest level, while at the output trough it has
already begun to recover. (A similar observation is made by Gordon (1980).)
The recovery of productivity in the trough may also be particularly strong
in very deep recession, in which financial pressure on firms increases the
costs of hoarding labor or permitting inefficient production. These
considerations serve at least to reduce this new productivity puzzle,
although they probably do not eliminate it.
putting the productivity question aside, Table 13 does suggest that
there are qualitative similarities between major recessions and less
dramatic economic fluctuations. This should be encouraging to forecasters
and policy—makers, whose tasks would be impossible if every severe
fluctuation were essentially a unique event.
VIII. Conclusion
This exercise in "measurement without theory" has supported some
existing perceptions about the cyclical behavior of labor markets and has
uncovered a few additional facts. To summarize the most important findings:33
1. procyclical labor productivity (SRIRL) appears to be present in
every industry, in both the pre—war and post-war periods. (This paper is
the first to document SRIRL for the pre—1932 period, as far as we know.)
However, in confirming this standard empirical result, we have found two
qualifications: First, productivity is a leading, rather than coincident,
variable. Second, SRIRL may be less pronounced in major recessions.
2. weekly hours and employment are strongly procyclical. Hours lead
output, while employment lags. Our evidence that employment is lagging
rather than coincident is somewhat novel; otherwise, these observations
replicate previous results.
3. A new finding is that there has been an increased reliance in the
post—war period on layoffs, rather than short work—weeks, as a means of
reducing labor input.
4. The relationship of the real wage to other variables over the
business cycle is weak, and has been weaker in the post—war period. On the
question of whether any cyclical sensitivity of the real wage exists at all,
the results from the frequency domain analysis are much more affirmative
than those for the time domain. The difference between the two approaches
probably arises from the fact that the frequency domain analysis blocks out
some high—frequency interference which the time domain analysis does not;
this permits the frequency domain approach to recover a relationship at
business cycle frequencies which is less apparent in the time domain. The
noisiness of the wage—employment relationship in the time domain may explain
the inability of Geary and Kennan (1982) to reject the hypothesis that these
two series are independent.
5. To the extent that the real wage is related to the cycle, there
seems to be a definite difference between its pre—war and post—war34
behaviors. The real wage was procyclical (essentially coincident) in the
post—war period, but "half out—of—phase" (usually lagging) in the pre—war.
This difference has not been noticed before for real wages, although Creamer
(1950) found that nominal wages lagged the cycle in the early pre—war
period.
6. The relationship of product wages to the cycle is, if anything,
weaker and more erratic than that of real wages. Real weekly earnings are
strongly procyclical in both major samples.
7. Cyclical variation is a relatively small part of the total
variation of the labor market variables. (A similar finding is in Bernanke
(1983).) The postwar data exhibit more stability (i.e., less total variance
and and less business cycle variance). They also are more serially
persistent than the data from the earlier period, which may be interpreted
either as being consistent with Sachs' (1980) finding of greater rigidity,
or as being simply a reflection of a more stable economy.
We hope that this and similar analyses will lead to a better
understanding of the cyclical behavior of labor markets. However, we
emphasize once again that this research is intended to be a complement to,
not a substitute for, structural modelling of these phenomena.Notes
1. This is not to say that no empirical work on cyclical
aspects of labor supply exists for the pre—war period;
for a fascinating example, see Woytinsky (1942).
2. Bodkin (1969) notes that the French economist Rueff
made the same prediction in 1925.
3. This is reminiscent of Creamer's (1950) result for
nominal wage rates. See Section II.Data Appendix
I. Sources
The sources of the pre—war industry data used in this study are as
follows:
1) Earnings, hours, and employment data are from Beney (1936) and
Sayre (1940). These data are the result of an extensive monthly survey
conducted by the National Industrial Conference Board from 1920 until 1947.
All of the industries in the sample paid at least part of their
workforce by piece rates (see the Monthly Labor Review, vol. 41, no. 3,
September 1935, pp. 697—700). No correction was made for this.
2) Industrial production data are from the Federal Reserve Board. See
"New Federal Reserve Index of Industrial production," Federal Reserve
Bulletin, August 1940, pages 753—69 and 825—74.
3) Wholesale price indexes are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
See the following publications of the U.S. Departluent ot Labor: Handbook of
Labor Statistics (1931 ed., Bulletin 541; 1936 ed., Bulletin 616; 1941 ed.,
Bulletin 694), and Wholesale prices 1913 to 1927 (washington: U.S.G.P.O.,
1929, Bulletin 473). For the automobile industry we merged two BLS series
of motor vehicles prices. Neither series covered 1935; the price series on
all metal products was used to interpolate the automobiles price series for
that year.
4) The consumer price series is from Sayre (948).
All basic data were seasonally unadjusted. The span of the pre—war
sampleis January 1923 to Decetiher 1939. Although some of the data exist
before1923, there are two major problems with extending the sample furtnerback:1) Some of the industrial production data are missing. 2) There is a
six month qap in the NICB survey in 1923. The December 1939 stop date was
chosen so as to avoid consideration of the many special features of the
wartime economy.
The sources of the post—war industry data are as follows:
1) Earnings, hours, and eraployrtent data are from Employment and
Earnings, United States, (Bureau of Labor Statistics).
2)Industrialproduction indexes for industries 1—10 are from the
Federal Reserve Board. (See Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Board,
Industrial Production (1976). Updates are from the Federal Reserve
Bulletin, and some unpublished series were obtained directly from the
Board.) The output index for construction was obtained by dividing the
value of new construction (as reported by the Survey of Current Business) by
the Department of Commerce construction cost index (also available in the
SCB).
3) Wholesale prices are again from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
See Wholesale prices and Price Indexes, 1963 (BLS Bulletin 1513), Producer
Price Indexes, and the T1onthly Labor Review.
4) The consumer price series used to calculate real wages is the
Department of Labor's consumer price index (all items, wage earners and
clerical workers, revised.)
Again, the basic data are seasonally unadjusted. Tnespanot the post-
war sample is 1954—82, except for the wool textile industry, where the data
begin in January 195k. dequate data on output prices (and, tnerefore, on
product wages) are nissing for wool textiles after 1975 and for electric
services before 1958.The total manufacturing series were as follows:
1) For the pre-war period, output was measured by the industrial
production index for manufacturing. Employment, hours, and earnings data
come from the National Industrial Conference Board, as reported in Beney
(1936) and Sayre (1940). The NICB series are based on 25 major
manufacturinq industries; the coveraqe is similar but not identical to that
of the industrial production index. The manufacturing output price, used
only in the construction of the product wage variable, is the BLS wholesale
price index for non—aqricultural, non—fuel goods. Again, the coverage is
similar but not identical to that of the I? index.
2)For the post-war period, again the Ip index for manufacturing is
used to measure output. Employment, hours, and earnings data are for
manufacturinq production workers; the output price is the wholesale price
index for total manufactuerers. Those data are from Business Statistics and




The loq—differenced data series appeared in general to be stationary.
We arrived at this conclusion by studying the autocorrelations and partial
autocorrelations of the log—differenced data and by testing for the presence
of trend shifts and higher—order trend terms in the log—levels. Rejections
of stationarity were sufficiently infrequent and weak that, for the sake of
uniform treatment of the data, we decided to ignore then.III. Reduction of High-Frequency Noise
The spectra ofmostof the series exhibited considerable powerinthe
higherfrequencies; high—frequency noise (primarily seasonality) nay
interfere with the analysis of the data at business—cycle frequencies. To
reduce this noise,we regressed each log—differenced series against a
constant,seasonal dummies, and (where applicable) dummy variables for
strikeperiods. (There was no pooling of regressions across industries or
between the two najor sample periods. There also appeared to be no need to
allow for shifts of the regression coefficients within subsamples.) The
residuals from these regressions, "cleaned" of muchof the very high— and
low—frequencynoise of the original series, were treated as the basic data
in the frequency and time domain analyses.
(ivOr 'JX7 i'-c )IV. Details of Frequency Domain Calculations
The entries of Tables 7 through 10 were constructed by simple averaging of
the finite Fourier transforms (evaluated at evenly-spaced intervals on (O,it)) for
each data series. Since the pre— and post—war sample sizes differed, the
frequencies corresponding to the "business cycle" varied as well; thus, each
calculation involved averages of about 7 (that is, 1/12—1/96) of the number of
periodogram ordinates calculated for each variable.
Table 6 gives square roots of the cumulated periodograni ordinates (between 12
and 96 months) for each variable. These calculations (and those in the remaining
tables) will not be affected by the seasonal or strike adjustments made for the
log—differenced data.
Standard errors for the sample coherenceand phasebetween each pair of







where v is twice the number of periodogram ordinates in the 12 to96 month
range. Since these expressions are derived from the asymptotic behavior of
finite Fourier transforms, the resulting confidence intervals are only
approximate, and will be poorly behaved fornear zero or one; still, the
standard errors are useful guides to the precision of the estimates.The estimated phase leads of Tables 8 through 10 were expressed in months by
dividing the estimated phase angle 0 (and its standard error) bythe frequency
corresponding to the period in the center of the bandwidthconsidered. That is,
the phase leads calculated for the 12 to 96, 2 to 12, 12 to 24, and 24 to 96
month bandwidths correspond to cycles with period lengths 54, 7, 18, and60
months, respectively. These period lengths are uniformly higherthan the period
lengths corresponding to the average frequency in the bandwidth(which is, for
example, about 2/(1/12 +1/96)=21.33months for the 12 to 96 bandwidth). Since
the coherences and phase angles are implicitly assumed to be constant withineach
frequency band, the phase lead for any frequency in the interval canbe obtained
by rescaling; that is, to obtain a phase lead for a "typical"20 month cycle,
the reported phase lead (and its standard error) for the 12 to 24 monthbandwidth
can simply be multiplied by 20/18. The tests of equalityof phase angles in
Table 9 do not use the "scaled" phase leads above; rather, t—statistics forthe
difference in phase angles are constructed directly from the standard error
formulae reported above (and use the large-sample independence of the phase
estimates for the pre- and postwar periods).
All calculations were carried out using the RATS statistical package(see
Doan and Litterrnan (1981)). Other, more theoretical references to frequency
domain methods are the texts by Hannan (1970) and Anderson (1971).TABLE 1:Industries included in data set
I. Manufacturing Industries (pre—war and post—war data)
Pre-War Industry Title
1.Iron and steel (STEEL)
2. Automobiles (AUTOS)
3. Meat packing (MEAT)
4. Paper and pulp (PAPER)
5. Boots and shoes (SHOES)
6. Wool textiles (WOOL)
7. Leather tanning (LEATH)
and finishing
8. Lumber and millwork (LUMBR)
(excluding furniture)
9. All manufacturing (ALL MIFO)
industries
Post—War Industry Title (sIc Code)
Blast furnaces and steel mills (331)
Motor vehicles and equipment (371)
Meat packing plants (201)
Paper and allied products (26)
Footwear, except rubber (314)
Weaving and finishing mills, wool (223)
Leather tanning and finishing (311)
Lumber and wood products (24)
All manufacturing industries
II. Non-Manufacturing Industries (post-war data only)








NA (coNsT)TABLE 2:Monthly rates of growth (per cent) of output,
employment, weekly hours, and productivity
Industry Period IF EMP HRS PROD
STEEL 1923 —39 0.18 0.07 -0.25 0.35
1954 —82 —0.12 —0.26 —0.01 0.14
AUTOS 1923 -39 0.34 0.07 -0.14 0.42
1954 -82 0.16 -0.09 0.00 0.25
MEAT 1923 -39 0.04 0.05 -0.08 0.07
1954 -82 0.18 0.02 -0.01 0.17
PAPER 1923 -39 0.33 0.06 -0.12 0.39
1954 -82 0.33 0.03 0.00 0.29
SHOES 1923 -39 0.01 -0.07 -0.14 0.22
1954 —82 —0.13 -0.22 —0.01 0.10
WOOL 1923 -39 0.04 -0.08 -0.12 0.24
1958-82 -0.14 -0.43 0.01 0.28
LEATH 1923 —39 -0.09 -0.14 -0.10 0.15
1954 -82 -0.17 -0.29 0.00 0.12
LUT1BR 1923 -39 -0.07 —0.14 -0.10 0.17
1954 -82 0.18 -0.06 0.01 0.23
ALL MFG 1923 -39 0.22 -0.01 -0.12 0.34
1954 -82 0.27 —0.02 0.00 0.29
COAL 1954 —82 0.18 —0.13 0.06 0.26
ELECT 1954 —82 0.48 0.11 0.00 0.36
CONET 1954 —82 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.00TABLE 3:Monthly rates of growth (per cent) of real wages,
product wages, and real weekly earnings
Industry Period WE WP EARN
STEEL 1923 -39 0.31 0.29 0.06
1954 -82 0.16 0.10 0.15
AUTOS 1923 -39 0.31 0.30 0.17
1954—82 0.11 0.16 0.11
MEAT 1923 -39 0.29 0.29 0.21
1954 -82 0.06 0.15 0.04
PAPER 1923 —39 0.24 0.24 0.12
1954
—82 0.13 0.15 0.13
SHOES 1923 —39 0.11 —0.01 —0.03
1954-82 0.03 0.05 0.02
WOOL 1923 —39 0.21 0.20 1 0.08
1958 -82 0.05 0.31 ) 0.06
LEATH 1923 —39 0.27 0.25 0.17
1954—82 0.05 0.03 0.05
LUMBE 1923 -39 0.28 0.27 0.17
1954 -82 0.09 0.13 0.10
ALL MPG 1923 -39 0.26 0.27 0.14
1954 -82 0.09 0.10 0.09
COAL 1954 —82 0.12 -0.04 0.18
(2) ELECT 1958 -82 0.13 0.05 0.13
CONST 1954 —82 0.09 0.03 0.11
Notes:
(1) Sample period is1958 —75.
(2)Sampleperiod is 1958 —82.TABLE 4: Standard deviations (per cent) of monthly growth rates
of output, employment, weekly hours and productivity
Industry Period IP EMP HRS PROD
STEEL 1923 -39 13.40 4.70 6.85 8.00
1954 —82 16.09 11.53 2.25 7.06
AUTOS 1923 —39 30.12 10.37 8.13 22.47
1954 -82 7.80 9.69 4.14 8.69
MEAT 1923 —39 9.91 4.03 3.16 7.95
1954 -82 2.82 1.80 1.84 3.87
PAPER 1923 -39 5.71 1.83 2.47 5.15
1954 -82 1.83 1.06 0.98 2.06
SHOES 1923 —39 11.87 3.18 5.39 10.08
1954 -82 4.05 2.86 2.58 5.63
WOOL 1923 —39 12.04 6.09 4.93 8.64
1958 -82 9.30 2.71 2.01 10.17
LEATH 1923 —39 5.52 2.93 3.52 5.46
1954 —82 3.39 2.32 1.71 4.82
LUNBR 1923 -39 6.80 5.63 4.88 6.79
1954 —82 2.85 2.47 1.87 3.62
ALL MFG 1923—39 4.70 2.36 2.59 2.92
1954 —82 3.28 1.36 1.17 2.58
COAL 1954 —82 14.00 16.05 8.18 11.74
ELECT 1954 —82 1.45 0.91 0.91 1.94
CONST 1954 -82 7.88 6.17 2.87 5.25TABLE 5: Standard deviations (per cent) of monthly growth rates
of real wages, product wages, and real weekly earnings
Industry Period WR WP EARN
STEEL 1923 —39 2.14 2.24 7.02
1954 —82 1.32 1.50 2.96
AUTOS 1923 —39 1.90 2.24 8.32
1954 —82 1.69 1.87 5.21
MEAT 1923 —39 2.24 4.81 3.25
IjL —
PAPER 1923 —39 1.30 2.14 2.43
1954 —82 0.83 3.61 1.36
SHOES 1923 —39 2.70 2.47 5.41
1954 -82 0.95 1.80 2.60
WOOL 1923 -39 2.14 2.97 4.79
1958 -82 1.06 1.48(1) 2.37
LEATH 1923 -39 1.47 3.03 3.37
1954 —82 0.92 2.96 2.12
LUNBR 1923 —39 4.14 4.74 5.25
1954 —82 1.32 1.99 2.37
ALL MFG 1923 —39 1.24 1.48 2.55
1954 —82 2.30 2.34 2.69
COAL 1954 —82 1.95 2.19 9.04
ELECT 1954 -82 0.90 i.ii(2) 1.44
CONST 1954 —82 1.05 1.02 2.80
Notes:
(1) Sample period in 1958 —75.
(2) Sample period in 1958 —82.TABLE 6:Standard deviations (per cent) of monthly growth rates
of five variables; business cycle frequencies
(12 to 96 months) only
Industry Period IP EP HES PROD WR
STEEL 1923—39 3.96 1.59 1.73 1.53 0.59
1954-82 2.28 1.05 0.48 1.15 0.27
AUTOS 1923—39 4.54 2.72 1.46 2.93 0.36
1954—82 1.85 1.43 0.47 0.77 0.31
MEAT 1923—39 1.66 1.05 0.49 1.01 0.49
1954—82 0.46 0.27 0.19 0.36 0.21
PAPER 1923—39 1.33 0.60 0.65 0.76 0.36
1954—82 0.56 0.30 0.16 0.27 0.14
SHOES 1923—39 1.26 0.47 0.94 0.78 0.68
1954-82 0.71 0.39 0.38 0.60 0.17
WOOL 1923—39 3.16 1.69 1.06 0.99 0.67
1954—82 1.56 1.01 0.61 1.74 0.22
LEATH 1923—39 1.19 0.97 0.77 0.82 0.47
1954—82 0.59 0.49 0.22 0.52 0.14
LUNBR 1923-39 1.75 1.48 0.85 1.19 0.70
1954-82 0.87 0.61 0.21 0.44 0.23
ALL MFG 1923-39 1.53 0.97 0.67 0.48
1954—82 0.60 0.39 0.15 0.21 0.20
COAL 1954—82 0.92 0.71 0.61 0.84 0.25
ELECT 1954-82 0.22 0.16 0.10 0.28 0.13
CONST 1954—82 0.69 0.75 0.21 0.77 0.15TABLE 7: Coherences of growth rates of six
variables with growth rate of output
Bandwidth: 12 months to 96 months
1 .Pre—WarData
Industry ENP HRS PROD WJ EARN
STEEL .828 .883 .915 .272 .230 .854
(.060) (.042)(.031)(.ri5) (.179) (.osi)
AUTOS .854 .583 .692 .252 .271 .568
(.051) (.125) (.099) (J77) (.175) (.128)
MEAT .773 .657 .836 ,5ti .330 .292
(.076) (.107) (.057) (.134) (.168) (.173)
PAPER .661 .870 .721 .610 .507 .836
(.106) (.046) (.091) (,iio) (.140) (.057)
SHOES .717 .836 .651 .098 .142 .794
(.092) (.057) (.109) (.io)(.iss) (.070)
WOOL .934 .878 .783 .449 .429 .797
(.024) (.043) (.073) (,i51) (.154) (.069)
LEATH .754 .742 .341 .473 .634 823
(.082) (.085) (.167) (.147) (.113) (.061)
LUMBR .749 .784 .276 .354 .659 .638
(.083) (.073)(.175) (.165) (.107) (.112)
ALL MPG .935 .916 .567 .567 .607 .902
(.024) (.031) (.128) (.12) (i19) (.035)
Note:
Standard errors are in parenthesesTABLE 7: (Continued)
2. Post-War Data
Industry EMP HRS PROD WIR WP EARN
STEEL .898 .895 .863 .527 .180 .829
(.027) (.028) (.036) (.102) (.137) (.044)
AUTOS .912 .724 .479 .733 .578 .809
(.024) (.067) (.109) (.065) (.094) (.049)
MEAT .592 .585 .618 .430 .706 .648
(.092) (.093) (.087) (.115) (.071) (.082)
PAPER .911 .771 .856 .360 .735 .672
(.024) (.057) (.038) (.123) (.0.65) (.078)
SHOES .714 .594 .503 .159 .094 .590
(.069) (.092) (.106) (.138) (.140) (.092)
WOOL .418 .295 .586 .252 .573 .294
(.127) (.141) (.101) (.144) (.123) (.141)
LEATH .620 .412 .416 .164 .368 .385
(.087) (.117) (.117) (.138) (.122) (.120)
LUMBR .881 .845 .658 .378 .489 .779
(.032) (.040) (.080) (.121) (.108) (.056)
ALL MFG .941 .839 .684 .378 .314 .693
(.016) (.042) (.075) (.121) (.128) (.073)
COAL .603 .710 .331 .371 .063 .676
(.090) (.070) (.126) (.122) (.141) (.077)
ELECT .290 .359 .734 .287 .203 .413
(.129) (.123) (.065) (.130) (.148) (.117)
COMST .568 .344 .384 .274 .507 .397
(.096) (.125) (.121) (.131) (.105) (.119)TABLE 8: Phase leads of growth rates of six
variables with respect to growth rate
of output, in months
Bandwidth: 12 months to 96 months
1. Pre—War Data
Industry ELP HRS PROD WR WP EARN
STEEL -4.7 1.8 2.3 —5.3 —0.3 1.2
(1.11) (0.9) (0.7) (5.7) (6.g) (1.0)
AUTOS 10.4 2.9 -10.6 -6.0 9.8
(2.3) (1.7) (6.2) (5.8) (2.4)
MEAT —6.0 2.2 4.6 —22.2 —7.6 —5.1
(1.3) (1.9) (1.1) (2.5) (4.7) (5.3)
PAPER -7.3 2.4 2.3 -19.3 26.5 —0.5
(1.8) (0.9) (1.6) (2.1) (2.8) (i .1)
SHOES -6.3 -2.4 9.0 —11.5 9.0 -3.0
(1.6) (1.1) (1.9) (16.6)(11.3) (1.2)
WOOL —2.6 2.1 2.7 —15.8 24.7 —0.6
(0.6) (0.9) (1.3) (3.2) (3.4) (1.2)
LEATH -5.7 2.8 11.1 -14.6 26.5 -0.7
(1.4) (1.5) (4.5) (3.0) (1.9) (1.1)
LUMBR -3.8 2.0 11.2 -19.1 27.0 -0.7
(1.4) (1.3) (5.7) (4.3) (1.9) (2.0)
ALL MFG —3.9 2.3 9.3 —11.6 —19.5 —0.3
(0.6) (0.7) (2.4) (2.4) (2.1) (0.8)
Note:
Standarderrors are in parentheses.TABLE 8: (Continued)
2. Post—War Data
Industry ENP HRS PROD WP EARN
STEEL —2.8 1.1 2.2 3.1 9.3 1.6
(0.6) (0.6) (0.7) (2.0) (6.6) (0.8)
AUTOS —2.5 4.5 5.0 3.6 3.9 4.1
(0.5) (1.2) (2.2) (1.1) (1.7) (0.9)
MEAT —4.1 2.3 1.8 0.1 —1.6 1.3
(1.7) (1.7) (1.6) (2.6) (1.2) (1.4)
PAPER —4.4 2.1 3.9 7.2 10.0 3.5
(0.6) (1.0) (0.7) (3.2) (1.1) (1.3)
SHOES —5.9 1.6 3.8 —7.6 11.9 0.8
(1.2) (1.7) (2.1) (7.6) (12.9) (1.7)
WOOL —3.4 -1.0 1.5 4.9 24.3 0.5
(2.8) (4.1) (1.8) (4.9) (2.0) (4.1)
LEATH —2.3 3.5 1.7 —5.4 12.4 1.8
(1.5) (2.7) (2.7) (7.3) (3.1) (2.9)
LUMBR —3.9 2.0 6.4 —1.2 25.7 1.0
(0.7) (0.8) (1.4) (3.0) (2.2) (1.0)
ALL MPG —2.4 2.1 4.4
(0.5) (0.8) (.1.3) (3.0) (3.7) (i.3)
COAL —5.1 —0.1 9.1 —10.4 —21.3 —1.7
(1.6) (1.2) (3.5) (3.0) (19.2) (1.3)
ELECT —16.0 —0.3 1.9 2.8 —5.4 1.3
(4.0) (3.2) (1.1) (4.1) (4.9) (2.7)
CONST —4.2 4.2 5.0 11.6 12.3 6.7
(1.8) (3.3) (2.9) (4.3) (2.0) (2.8)TABLE 9: Phaseleadsof growth rates of six
variables with respect to growth rate
of output, in months
(a) Bandwidth:2 months to 12 months
(b) Bandwidth: 12 months to 24 months
Cc) Bandwidth: 24 months to 96 months
1. Pre—War Data
Industry EMP HRS PROD WR WP EARN
(a) —0.4 0.0 0.2 -1.9 2.5 —0.1
STEEL (b) —1.6 0.6 0.8 2.2 2.4 0.8
(c) —5.0 2.1 2.5_13.8* _13.5* —0.4
(a) 0.3 0.5 —0.2 —1.4 —1.2 O4
AUTOS(b) -0.3 4.1 -0.9 -2.2 —1.2 4.0
(c) 0.1 6.6 —3.6 —15.3 —9.4 5.0*
(a) —1.0 —0.1 0.2 —2.0 —1.2 —0.2
MEAT (b) —2.2 0.6 1.1 —8.2 —5.5 0.2
(c) -5.8 23.9* 1O.4*** -.16.1* O.3***_18.9***
(a) -1.4 —0.6 0.3 -3.0 -2.4 —0.9
PAPER(b) -3.1 0.7 0.8 -7.1 —8.9 0.1
(c) —4.5 3.4 2.7 —18.1 27.8 —2.7
(a) —0.3 —0.1 0.1 2.8 2.6 0.1
SHOES (b) —1.9 —0.9 3.0 —7.4 4.4 —1.1
(c) —8.6 —1.1 9.8 —5.0 0.6 —2.3
(a) —0.6 —0.1 0.4 —2.6 —3.4 —0.3
WOOL(b) —0.6 0.6 0.6 —5.3 —8.9 0.2
(c) —4.4 2.9 5.3 —17.5 25.6 —3.5
(a) 0.0 —0.1 0.0 1.9 —3.3 0.2
LEATH(b)-2.4 0.8 3.5 -4.9 8.8 0.1
(c) —3.2 4.0 18.7 —15.9 29.5 —4.0
(a) —0.4 0.6 —0.1 —2.6 -3.0 0.4
LUMBR(b) -1.8 0.4 4.6 —7.4 —8.8 —0.5
(c)_1.3* 5.7 -.0.9* -5.7 28.8 0.8





0.0 ALL G (b) -1.7 0.6 2.3
—12.8 —20.0 -0.7 (c) 3.4 19.9***
Note: Asterisks denote significance of t—tests ofdifference of phase angles
between frequency bands (b) and (c), at marginal significancelevels
of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).TABLE 9: (Continued)
2. Post—War Data
Industry EMP HRS PROD WR WP EARN
(a) -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.9 0.1
STEEL(b) -0.9 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.3
(c) —3.3 2.9***44* 4.7 17.6 3.4
(a) -0.2 -0.1 1.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
AUTOS(b) —0.8 1.5 1.6 1.2 2.0 1.4
(c) —2.7 4.6 6.1 3.9 _O.7* 43
(a) -1.3 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 -0.1
MEAT(b) -1.3 0.9 0.5 1.0 -0.2 0.9
(c) 4.9 1.9 2.4 _5.6* —2.4 —1.5
(a) 0.4 -0.6 0.0 2.7 -2.0 -0.4
PAPER(b) -1.2 0.3 1.0 —2.8 3.1 0.1
(c) —5.5 3.6 5.8* 8.7 12.0 5.8*
(a) 0.3 0.5 0.1 1.0 1.2 0.5
SHOES(b) —1.9 0.9 0.6 -3.5 5.3 0.5
(c) —6.7 0.8 8.3 —5.6 10.9 0.1
(a) 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 2.5 0.1
WOOL(b) —1.9 —1.9 0.5 1.0 —5.2 0.5
(c) —2.2 3.7 0.8 7.1 25.2** 4.6
(a) 0.7 0.7 -0.1 0.7 1.8 0.7
LEATH(b) -0.4 1.5 -0.1 -3.3 -8.5 0.7
(c) —3.2 3.0 4.2 —2.6 13.3 1.7
(a) -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.4 1.2 0.3
LUNBR (b) -1.4 0.7 1.3 -2.6 -7.7 0.2
(c) —6.2 0.8 18.7* —8.5 29.1 0.2
(a) -0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.1
ALL MFG (b) -0.7 0.0 1.0 -1.8 2.8 -0.7
(c) —2.9 4•7*9.55.7 9.39.5
(a) —0.2 —0.2 0.1 —2.7 —1.6 —0.2
COAL (b) —1.1 —0.3 0.7 —3.7 —3.2 —1.1
(c) -6.2 0.8 18.7*** -8.5 29.0 0.2
(a) 2.1 0.7 -0.1 -2.2 0.6 0.3
ELECT (b) —.7 1.1 0.3 —3.3 —4.4 —0.8
(c) —16.5 —°.0 3.1 —0.1 5.2
(a) 0.0 0.2 0.0 —3.4 —3.1 0.2
CONST(h) —0.8 1.6 0.6 7.0 5.6 3.2
(c) —6.7 1.5 8.5 4.9***10.3** 4.0Table 10: Coherences and phase leads of growth rates
of output in each industry with respect to
growth rate of "all manufacturing" output
Bandwidth:12 months to 96 months





















































































COAL 1954—82 28.4(13.0) —5.4(4.1)
ELECT 1954-82 44.7(11.3) -2.1(2.4)(*)
(**)
(*11*)
TABLE 11: VAR F—tests
denotes F—test significant at .10 level
denotes F—test significant at .05 level
denotes F—test significant at .01 level
Dependent Variables Industry Independent Variables
'P
HRS
IP KRS EMP WR
1. Pre-War Data









STEEL *41* *11* *** 41*41
AUTOS ***
MEAT ** * 41
PAPER *41* * 41
SHOES *41* *41* ***
WOOL *41* *41 *11*
LEATH ****** ***
LUMBR *41 ***
ALL MPG *** * *41*TABLE 11: VAR F—tests (continued)
1. Pre—War Data
Dependent Variables Industry Independent Variables
IP HRS EMP WR
EMP
STEEL *
AUTOS ****** *11 *
MEAT 41* 41*
PAPER 41* *41












LUMBR *41* * * *41*











NEAT *** ** *
PAPER *** *11 ***
SHOES 41*91 *11* *91
WOOL 41*41 *91*
LEATH *** **
LUNBR 91*91 91*41 *91*






MEAT *91 *91* **
PAPER *** *91* *
SHOES *** *91* ***
WOOL 41 *91* *91* *41*
LEATH *** *91 *
LUNBR ***
ALL MPG *** *41* *91
COAL *91* *41* * *91
ELECT *31*
CONST ***TABLE 11: VAR F—tests (continued)
2. Post-War Data
Dependent Variables Industry IndependentVariables
IF HRS EMP WR
Note:
The F—tests whose outcomes are reported are tests of the joint significance of
all 12 lags of the independent variable in the explanation of the dependent




































ELECT ** *** ***




















































































































error in: k IP HRS EMP WR
I? 6 83/92 3/2 10/5 4/0
12 75/83 6/3 11/7 8/7
24 71/80 8/3 12/7 10/9
48 71/80 8/3 12/7 10/9
EMP 6 21/31 1/5 72/62 6/2
12 19/30 5/6 68/57 8/7
24 19/30 5/6 65/55 11/10
48 19/30 5/6 65/54 11/10
HRS 6 30/11 61/86 3/2 6/2
12 32/14 56/80 4/3 8/3
24 32/14 54/79 4/4 10/4
48 32/14 54/79 4/4 10/4
WR 6 9/1 10/2 2/2 80/96
12 13/2 10/3 8/3 69/93
24 13/3 10/4 10/3 67/91
13/3. 10/4 10/3 66/91
PROD 6 50/64 26/18 19/17 5/1
12 45/60 27/16 20/18 8/6
24 43/58 26/17 19/18 12/8
48 43/58 26/17 19/18 12/8TAELE 12:(Continued)
7. Leather tanning and finishing
Triangularized innovation in:
Forecast
error in: k I? HRS E!1P
IP 6 84/90 5/3 8/5 3/2
12 80/87 8/5 7/5 4/3
24 78/85 10/7 8/5 5/4
48 78/85 10/7 8/5 5/4
EP1P 6 21/8 8/9 69/82 2/2
12 23/8 9/10 65/78 4/4
24 29/8 9/10 58/78 4/4
48 29/8 10/10 56/78 5/4
MRS 6 19/3 69/89 7/3 6/5
12 21/5 65/84 8/6 6/6
24 23/5 61/82 9/6 7/7
48 24/5 60/81 9/6 7/7
6 8/3 12/1 7/3 72/92
12 14/4 14/3 8/5 64/88
24 16/5 16/3 9/5 59/87
98 16/5 16/3 9/5 58/87
PROD 6 24/58 36/14 37/26 3/1
12 33/55 34/17 30/25 4/3
24 34/54 34/17 28/25 4/4
48 35/53 34/17 28/25 4/4TABLE 12:(Continued)
9. All mariufacturinq firms
Triangularized innovations in:
Forecast
error in: k IP HRS EMP WR
1P 6 94/93 1/2 3/4 2/1
12 77/86 8/4 8/7 7/3
24 71/82 12/6 10/9 7/3
48 70/80 12/6 11/10 7/4
EMP 6 64/59 1/2 33/39 2/0
12 57/57 9/3 31/39 3/2
24 54/57 11/4 30/38 5/2
48 53/56 11/4 31/38 5/2
HRS 6 51/22 38/74 9/4 1/1
12 47/21 38/71 12/5 2/3
24 46/22 37/68 14/6 4/4
48 46/22 37/68 14/6 4/4
WR 6 7/2 5/3 11/1 77/94
12 7/3 9/3 14/2 70/92
24 13/4 9/3 15/2 62/91
48 14/4 9/3 16/2 61/91
PRO!) 6 22/18 41/47 36/34 2/1
12 22/18 39/44 34/35 5,13
24 20/19 39/42 35/36 5/3
48 21/19 39/42 35/36 5/3TABLE 13: Trough—to—peak ratios of seven variables
for four selected recessions
I: 1933 I /1929 III
It: 1938 11/1937 II
III: 1975I/1973 IV
IV: 1982 IV/1981 III
Industry Cycle IP EMP PROD EARN
STEEL I .17 .50 .56 .62 .91 .84 .50
II .36 .72 .65 .77 .95 .92 .62
III .87 .96 .. .95 1.00 .81 .95
[V .57 .68 .96 .87 .99 1.05 .94
AUTOS I .18 .40 .76 .58 .99 .88 .75
II .36 .49 .85 .86 1.02 .90 .87
[II .60 .74 .93 .88 .95 .92 .88
IV .96 .87 1.01 1.10 .97 .97 .97
MEAT I .91 .77 .95 1.25 .95 1.50 .90
II 1.07 .93 1.03 1.12 .9') 1.12 1.02
III .97 .98 .99 1.00 1.01 1.17 1.00
IV .90 .96 1.00 .94 .94 .94 .94
PAPER I .59 .74 .79 1.01 .99 .87 .79
II .71 .87 .86 .95 1.06 1.13 .91
III .74 .88 .95 .89 .96 .82 .91
IV .98 .95 .99 1.05 1.02 1.02 1.01
SHOES I .79 .89 .92 .96 .99 .95 .91
II .82 .93 .73 1.20 1.001.02 .73
[II .81 .87 .91 1 .03 .95 .98 .86
[V .87 .91 .98 .97 1.00 1.01 .qRTABLE 13: (continued)
Indus Cycle IP EP HRS PROD WR WP EARN
WOOL I .62 .73 .88 .95 .941.23 .83
II .44 .68 .80 .80 1.01 1.21 .81
III .47 .57 .71 1.16 .91 1.23 .65
IV .77 .77 .82 1.22 .99 NA .82
LEATH I .76 .80 .91 1.04 .98 1.43 .89
II .71 .79 .85 1.06 1.03 1.23 .87
III 1.03 .99 .99 1.06 .95 1.24 .94
IV .88 .90 1.01 .97 1.02 1.07 1.03
LUMBR I .32 .42 .74 1.04 .92 1.13 .68
II .67 .86 .87 .89 1.02 1.22 .88
LII .75 .78 .94 1.01 .96 1.21 .91
IV 1.10 .99 1.02 1.09 1.01 1.06 1.02
ALL MPGI .50
1 .97 1.04 .78 II .62 .73 .81
.97 .88 .93 III .81 .88 .96
1.01 .99 1.02 .98 IV .90 .90 .99
COAL III 1.05 1.20 1.01 .87 .96 .68 .97
IV .83 .84 .91 1.09 1.02 1.02 .93
ELECT III .96 .98 .97 1.00 .96 .80 .94
IV .93 1.00 1.01 .93 1.02 1.00 1.02
CONST III .78 .87 .98 .92 .94 .89 .92
IV .99 .93 .98 1.09 1.00 1.04 .98
Note:
The variables from which the ratios are formed are detrended,deseasonalized,
quarterly averages of levels (not growthrates). Peak and trough quarters are
from the official NBER chronology.Figure 1
Response of log—levels to innovation in output growth
Prewar, iron and steel
Figure la here Figure lb here
Figure ic here Figure ld hereFigure 2
Response of log—levels to innovation in output growth
Postwar, iron and steel
Figure 2a here Figure 2b here
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